In Defence of Fictional Incompetence more

©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Ratio (new series) XXIII 2 June 2010 0034-0006 IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE Dan Cavedon-Taylor Abstract The claim that photographs are fictionally incompetent (i.e. that they can only depict those particulars they are appropriately caus- ally related to) is argued by Noel Carroll, Gregory Currie, and Nigel Warburton to be falsified by cinematic works of fiction. In response I firstly argue that it does not follow from cinema's having a capacity for the representation of ficta that photography has a capacity for the representation of ficta. Secondly, and inspired by the work of Roger Scruton, I develop an account of how it is that cinema represents ficta on which this is fundamentally a matter of dramatic/theatrical representation. I argue that in cinematic fiction photography delivers a pre-existent representation of ficta rather than creating or generating fictional content. With this being so, the claim that photography is fictionally incompetent is compatible with cinematic fiction.1 1. Introduction Photography is standardly thought to be a causal process in a way that painting is not. Philosophers have expressed this idea and its alleged consequences in a myriad of ways. Kendall Walton, for instance, argues that the causal basis of photography allows viewers to literally, though indirectly, see the subjects of photo- graphs when gazing upon such pictures.2 Another alleged conse- quence of photography's causal nature, which will be my focus here, is that (unlike paintings) photographs are only capable of depicting concrete particulars. Jonathan Friday for instance claims that 'with regard to the choice of subject matter, the 1 Thanks to Keith Hossack for comments on earlier versions of this paper and to Paloma Atencia Linares for challenging discussions on this topic. In addition, the journal editor, John Cottingham, and an anonymous referee made suggestions that greatly improved the paper. Thanks also to the British Society of Aesthetics whose award of their PhD studentship made possible this research. 2 Kendall Walton, 'Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism', Critical Inquiry, 11 (1984). 142 DAN CAVEDON-TAYLOR photographer (unlike the painter, sculptor or poet) is limited to a particular real or existing object or state of affairs.'3 And Robert Hopkins writes of photographs that 'Such pictures only depict those particulars which they are causally related to in an appro- priate manner.'4 This idea is also endorsed by Roger Scruton in the guise of his claim that photography is 'fictionally incompe- tent.'5 Here I defend the thesis that photography is fictionally incompetent from the objection that it is false due to the exist- ence of cinematic works of fiction. I will not say much in favour of the fictional incompetence thesis, aiming only to show it compat- ible with cinematic fiction. I shall interpret the claim that pho- tography is fictionally incompetent as not only denying that photographs can depict ficta, but as also denying that they can depict abstracta and particulars they fail to be appropriately caus- ally related to (where the 'appropriate' causal relation typically involves light reflecting off the surfaces of particulars and into the camera's lens). 2. The argument from cinema Against the claim that photography is fictionally incompetent it is often argued that since there exist cinematic works of fiction, photography does not lack for anything when it comes to fictional competence. Nigel Warburton, for example, writes that cinema shows photography to be 'fictionally competent, adept even' and that to hold otherwise 'involves a serious distortion of the nature of cinema.'6 Moreover, Gregory Currie argues that photographs cannot be fictionally incompetent since 'in cinema we have rep- resentations of the story's [fictional] characters.'7 And Noel Carroll complains that cinema becomes 'utterly mystified and confused' if Scruton's line of thought is right, complaining that its consequence is that 'Films seem to become records of actors and 3 Jonathan Friday, 'Digital Imaging, Photographic Representation and Aesthetics', Ends and Means, 1 (1997), p. 9. 4 Robert Hopkins, Picture, Image and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 74. 5 Roger Scruton, 'Photography and Representation', Critical Inquiry, 7 (1981), p. 588. 6 Nigel Warburton, 'Pixels and Pictorialism: A Reply to Jonathan Friday', End and Means, 2 (1998), p. 24. 7 Gregory Currie, Image and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 76. ©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 143 actual places; their fictional referents dissolve.'8 Put simply, the argument here appears to be that since there are cinematic works of fiction and since cinema is a photographic medium, photogra- phy is fictionally competent (pace Scruton and others). Call this 'the argument from cinema.' There is clearly something to the above argument; it is unde- niable that there exist cinematic works of fiction which are pho- tographic in nature (in contrast with those constructed entirely from CGI, say). Still, it seems to me there is likewise something to the Scrutonian idea that because photographs are causally rooted in reality this precludes them from depicting anything other than concrete particulars appropriately related to the camera. I believe that having the right idea about the role played by photography with respect to cinema's capacity for the representation of ficta is key to resolving the tension between these two claims. Firstly, however, it is worth noting that the argument from cinema is fallacious. For photography is but one part of the cin- ematic whole. In fact Carroll notes precisely this when, in response to Scruton's claim that because photography cannot be art neither can cinema, he writes: Photography ... is not the only constituent element that com- prises film. In addition, there is, among other things, most notably, also editing. So even if all the arguments against pho- tography had won the day, those objections could not be trans- ferred to the case against film.9 Carroll is surely right here. It is illicit of Scruton's argument against the possibility of cinematic aesthetics to infer cinema's lack of some feature, x, on the basis of photography's (assumed) lack of x; since there is more to cinema than photographic rep- resentation, it is open that cinema has aesthetic value thanks to its non-photographic elements, such as editing. But note that it would similarly be to rely on fallacious part-whole reasoning if one were to infer photography's possession of some feature, x, on the basis of cinema's (assumed) possession of x. To do so would also be to implicidy suppose that photography is the sole element of 8 Noel Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 46. 9 Noel Carroll, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 30. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 144 DAN CAVEDON-TAYLOR cinema, when it is one among many. This is precisely what the argument from cinema does, however, in claiming that because there are cinematic works of fiction there must be photographs of ficta. But the fact that cinema frequently deals with the fictional is insufficient to establish that photography is fictionally competent since it is open that cinema acquires fictional content from its non-photographic elements. In reply, Carroll, Currie, and Warburton may claim that their inference is justified on the basis that it is unclear how to begin accounting for the fictional content of a cinematic work if not in terms of that work's photographic element. In response, however, one can point out that just as editing, a non-photographic element of cinema, may supply a cinematic work with aesthetic value not possessed by its photographic element, so too may editing be solely responsible for generating a cinematic work's fictional content. By piecing together various shots and monitor- ing continuity, for example, a fictional event can unfold on the screen the individual shots of which may have been taken in a completely different order. One may start by filming the shot that will comprise the sequence's ending and work backwards, say. Thus, thanks to editing, a sequence of events can be represented as occurring in an order in which they did not. In fact we might say that, stricdy speaking, the whole event, as temporally repre- sented by the work, did not occur. Either way, what results is fictional content thanks to one of cinema's non-photographic elements.10 In further response, I propose that explaining how cinema acquires fictional content, editing aside, will make some refer- ence to photographic representation, but that photography's role here does not licence the claim that there are literally photographs of ficta. Getting clear about this role requires we have a perspicuous understanding of how cinematic fiction operates. It seems to me that Scruton's positive account of cin- ematic fiction, an aspect of his theorising about photographs that is often passed over by critics, supplies just such an account and that, moreover, it is one that shows how photography can be fictionally incompetent and yet there be cinematic works of fiction. 10 I owe this point to Keith Hossack. ©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 145 3. A Scrutonian account of cinematic fiction Scruton's maxim here is that 'A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation.'11 I read Scruton here as suggesting that we think of cinema not as involving the photographic representation of fictional entities, but as involving the photographic representa- tion of objects which in turn non-photographically (dramatically or theatrically) represent ficta. I should stress that I think the aesthetic consequences Scruton draws from this claim are mis- taken. Scruton argues from the claim that cinematic fiction involves photographing dramatic representations that: 'It follows that if there is such a thing as a cinematic masterpiece it will be so because - like Wild Strawberries and La Regie dujeu - it is in the first place a dramatic masterpiece.'12 This inference is seeminglyjust as fallacious as that which is operative in Scruton's argument against cinematic aesthetics dealt with above. For, assuming cinematic works involve photographs of dramatic representations, it is open that a work could be a cinematic masterpiece thanks to its non- dramatic elements; namely, editing, sound, and so on. Scruton's claims concerning dramatic and cinematic representation are worth quoting at length: A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation, and what- ever representational properties belong to it belong by virtue of the representation that is effected in the dramatic action, that is, by virtue of the words and activities of the actors in the film. Ivan the Terrible represents the life of Ivan not because the camera was directed at him but because it was directed at an actor who played the part o/Ivan. Certainly the camera has its role in presenting the action ... It directs the audience's attention to this or that feature . . . [P] hotography permits the extension of dramatic representation into areas where previously it would not have been possible . . . Nonetheless, the process of photog- raphy does not, because it cannot, create the representation ... As all must agree, representation in the cinema involves an action in just the way that a play involves an action.13 Scruton is here arguing that the representation of ficta in cin- ematic works is of a second-order or meta-representational 11 Scruton, 'Photography and Representation', p. 577. 12 Ibid. 13 Scruton, 'Photography and Representation', p. 598-9. Emphasis in original. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 146 DAN CAVEDON-TAYLOR nature, involving the (photographic) representation of a (non- photographic, dramatic) representation. As I read them, these remarks are not at odds with Currie's claim that in cinema we find representation of fictional characters, but they do seem to deny that this is something achieved via photographic means. Rather, on the above account a cinematic work's means of representing ficta is explained in terms of an actor's, or a set's, or a prop's dramatic or theatrical representation of the fiction, and cinema's then pho- tographic representation of that actor, set, or prop (hence its second-order or meta-representational nature). On this view, the role of photography in accounting for a work's fictional content is merely as a delivery system. Instead of itself generating the work's fictional content, photography simply 'points' or 'directs' us to the site of a prior, already ongoing, representation of ficta which is non-photographic in nature. On this picture of cinematic fiction - contra Carroll, Currie, and Warburton - cinema does not give us photographs of Adantis, Flash Gordon, Darth Vader, and so on, but gives us photographs of actors, props, and sets that dramatically (non-photographically) represent such things.14 4. Why favour the Scrutonian account? We now have two competing accounts of cinema's fictional content. It is worth stressing that disagreement between the two proposals is not merely verbal. Carroll, Currie, and Waburton's position appears to be that cinematic fiction involves photo- graphs that are of, and which photographically represent, fictional entities (if this were not their claim - i.e. if they thought that photographs non-photographically represent ficta - then it would be difficult to see how cinematic fiction could begin to pose any threat to the fictional incompetence claim). The Scrutonian denies that cinema involves photographs of ficta, claiming that it instead involves photographs of particulars which non- photographically represent ficta. To further bring out the oppo- sition between these two positions, consider a photograph of a 14 I do not claim this to be an accurate reconstruction of Scruton's view since his use of the terms 'representation' and 'dramatic representation' are idiosyncratic (indeed the point of his paper is to deny there is, strictly speaking, such a thing as 'photographic' and hence 'cinematic' representation). However, the view above has interest independent of it being one that Scruton would agree to. ©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 147 model dressed as Saint Anne. Currie writes: 'I think it is merely prejudice to say that this cannot be a representation of Saint Anne'15 where this contrasts with the claim that it is 'a represen- tation of a representation.'16 Here Currie is precisely arguing against the Scrutonian meta-representational account I presented above and is, I take it, suggesting that the photograph photographi- cally represents Saint Anne. The Scrutonian is in a position to reply that their 'prejudice' is justified, however, claiming that we should not think of the picture as being a photograph of Saint Anne since it is the model, precisely in virtue of being dressed as Saint Anne, that is the one seemingly doing the representing of the Saint, rather than anything intrinsic to the camera's presence or the resulting photograph. The model would hardly fail to represent the Saint if we chose not to photograph them. So much for attempting to disambiguate the two competing accounts; are there any reasons one ought to prefer the Scrutonian one? Here are two. Firstly, the Scrutonian account preserves ordinary thought and talk about photographic representation whilst Carroll, Currie, and Warburton's account seems unacceptably revisionary. Sup- pose it is reported in the news that historians have unearthed a photograph of Shakespeare. As Susan Sontag notes, 'Having a photograph of Shakespeare would be like having a nail from the True Cross.'17 Suppose the picture is then revealed by the reporter to be a photo-still from the film Shakespeare in Love. Intuitively, we would feel cheated. The news reporter has surely misled us. The Scrutonian account explains this response: The still is not a photo- graph of Shakespeare, but is a photograph of someone playing (i.e. dramatically representing) him. Carroll, Currie, and Warbur- ton's response would presumably have to be that what the reporter said was true (nails from the True Cross abound!) and so feeling misled is an inappropriate response here. But this seems absurd. The still from Shakespeare in Love is no more a photograph of Shakespeare than a photograph of the Mona Lisa is a photo- graph of Lisa herself. Both the latter pictures are intuitively best described as photographic representations of particulars (i.e. Joseph Fiennes and a painting) which in turn (and in different 15 Currie, Image and Mind, p. 76. 16 Ibid. 17 Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 154. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 148 DAN CAVEDON-TAYLOR ways) non-photographically represent other things (i.e. Shakes- peare and Lisa), which is precisely what the Scrutonian account urges. Secondly, the Scrutonian account accords with the practice of film-making in a way that Carroll, Currie, and Warburton's appears not to. The Scrutonian account stresses the non- photographic, dramatic, nature of cinema in accounting for the medium's ability to represent ficta. This seems the right thing to do because it is intuitively the actors who are hard at work skilfully (or not as the case may be) representing the fiction, rather than the cameraperson. Not that the cameraperson doesn't work hard to represent on the Scrutonian account, but they represent the particulars already representing the fiction. This is not to deny that the cameraperson may artistically assist the actors in repre- senting the fiction or assist the audience's uptake of it by using the camera to 'screen-off' certain features of the set (such as the director, cables, over-head microphones, and so on). But it is to deny that the camera is what generates the representation of ficta, as if the work's fictional content were something overlaid on top of the acting by the camera's presence. Carroll, Currie and War- burton's claim that cinema gives us photographs of fictional enti- ties, rather than photographs of particulars non-photographically representing the ficta, has, at best, litde to say about the role that dramatic representation plays in accounting for cinema's fictional content. By contrast, the Scrutonian account places dramatic rep- resentation at the heart of cinema's capacity for the representa- tion of ficta, which is intuitively right where it belongs. An objection to the Scrutonian account worth considering is whether it trivialises the category 'documentary works of cinema', since the view appears to have the consequence that all works of cinematic fiction are documentaries, but documentaries of actors, props, and sets. Recall, in this context, Carroll's complaint that if photographs are fictionally incompetent then 'Films seem to become records of actors and actual places; their fictional refer- ents dissolve.'18 But why should it be absurd to regard fictional cinema as involving records of actors and actual places? Surely an aspiring actor, costumier, or set-designer may legitimately watch cinematic works of fiction not because of any interest in the fiction itself, but to study how great actors, costumiers, or set-designers Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image, p. 46. ©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd IN DEFENCE OF FICTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 149 represent ficta. Also, it is wrong to hold that the fictional incom- petence claim entails works of cinematic fiction are simply records of actors and actual places; they are records of actors and actual places which may in turn represent other things. Cinema's fic- tional referents do not 'dissolve' on this view since the Scrutonian account does not entail that works of cinematic fiction are docu- mentaries tout court, only that they have documentary elements embedded in them. The example of the aspiring actor/ costumier/set-designer shows this idea to be much less objection- able than it may first appear.19 I concede at this point that I have not offered any sort of definition of dramatic representation, but do not believe I need to. For it suffices for my purposes that dramatic representation (whatever it involves) is not photographic representation. And we can see that this is so by appreciating that how actors, sets, and props represent is intuitively different from how photographs represent. Plays, for instance, are seemingly dramatic, rather than photographic, representations; they are not depictive representa- tions, whilst photographs are. Moreover, none of this is to deny that there are lots of important and interesting differences between cinema and theatre.20 5. Conclusion I have argued, in Scrutonian spirit, that cinema's ability to repre- sent ficta is not due to anything intrinsic to the medium's photo- graphic element, but is a product of the medium's photographic element representing objects which non-photographically repre- sent ficta. In cinema we find representation of fictional characters, places, and stories, but this is to be explained in terms of non- photographic, dramatic, representation. The photographic ele- ments of cinema are mere delivery channels, or a conduit, for pre-existing representations of ficta rather than a means of gen- erating fictional content, perhaps in much the same way as testi- mony is traditionally (but not uncontroversially) thought of as a means for transmitting rather than generating knowledge. 19 On a similar point see Berys Gaut, 'Cinematic Art', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 60 (2002), p. 303. 20 See Paul Woodruff , The Necessity of Theater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 43-4. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 150 DAN CAVEDON-TAYLOR Whatever challenges face the claim that photography is fictionally incompetent, cinematic works of fiction do not constitute one of them. School of Philosophy Birkbeck College University of London Malet Street London WC1E 7HX dan. cavedon. taylor@gmail. com ©2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd